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Some Reflections on the General Principles
of the EU and on Solidarity in the Aftermath
of Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci AQ1
Filippo FONTANELLI
1. INTRODUCTION
On 19 January 2010, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down a preliminary
ruling1 in response to a reference lodged by the German Landesarbeitsgericht (Labour
Tribunal) of Du¨sseldorf.
The Labour Tribunal considered that, in order to resolve the main proceedings, it
needed the ECJ to answer two questions2 involving the interpretation of both the principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of age and of Directive 2000/78 (hereinafter the
Directive).3
The ECJ held that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as expressed
in the Directive, must be implemented by national judges, who are required – if it be the
case – to set aside conflicting national law, even in disputes between private parties.
The ruling was received with enthusiasm by many observers,4 AQ2who hailed it as a
display of a renewed ECJ’s integration-driven inspiration. Moreover, it contributed to
 PhD Candidate, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa. LL.M. Global Hauser Scholar, NYU, 2010.
International Court of Justice, 2010–2011. Email: <f.fontanelli@sssup.it>. Many thanks to J.H.H. Weiler, P.J. Birkinshaw,
G. Martinico, and an anonymous referee. All errors are mine.
1 Case C-555/07, Seda Ku¨cu¨kdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (Ku¨cu¨kdeveci), nyp.
2 See the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landesarbeitsgericht of Du¨sseldorf (Germany), lodged on
13 Dec. 2007. The first question focuses on the merits of the German measure challenged (whether the exception to the
principle of equal treatment enshrined therein is compatible with EU law). In the second one, instead, the Labour Court
asked whether ‘[i]n legal proceedings between private individuals, . . . a national court [must] disapply a statutory provision
which is clearly incompatible with Community law, or . . . a national law is disapplied only after the Court of Justice has
ruled on the provision at issue or on a substantially similar provision’.
3 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, 16).
4 Due to its relative novelty, the ruling has been commented mainly on the web. See, for instance, ‘Making
History, Making Law’, <http://adjudicatingeurope.eu/?p¼382>; ‘ECJ and Age Discrimination – Expanding Direct
Effect of Directives to Horizontal Relations, <http://ecjwatch.com/2010/02/11/kucukdeveci-ecj-and-age-discrimination-
expanding-direct-effect-of-directives-to-horizontal-relations/>; ‘ECJ Once Again on the Principle of
Non-discrimination on Grounds of Age’, <http://sociaalrecht.blogspot.com/2010/01/ecj-once-again-on-principle-of-
non.html>); ‘The ECJ Has Developed a New Doctrine’, <http://europeanjournal.typepad.com/my_weblog/2010/02/
the-ecj-has-developed-a-new-doctrine.html>; ‘In Defence of Para. 22’, <http://adjudicatingeurope.eu/?p¼387>);
‘Horizontal Direct Effect of Directives (?) and Age Discrimination: Case C-555/07’, <http://eulaw.typepad.com/
eulawblog/2010/02/horizontal-direct-effect-of-directives-and-age-discrimination-case-c-55507.html>); ‘De l’effet hor-
izontale des directives’, <http://jmieurope.typepad.com/jmi/2010/01/de-leffet-direct-horizontal-des-directives.html>;
‘Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, a European Case’, <http://julienfrisch.blogspot.com/2010/02/kucukdeveci-european-case.html>). An
unenthusiastic comment that comes to conclusions similar to those that are expressed in this note is ‘Mangold II’,
Fontanelli, Filippo. ‘Some Reflections on the General Principles of the EU and on Solidarity in the
Aftermath of Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci ’. European Public Law 17, no. 2 (2011): 225–240.
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normalize the uneasy consequences of the infamous Mangold decision and allegedly paved
the way for the unconditional acknowledgment of the Directive’s horizontal direct effect.
The present article, after describing the background of the case and relevant case law,
investigates the foundations of the general principles’ horizontal effect,5 before providing
some reflections on the role of solidarity in the post-Lisbon European Union (EU), in light
of the rationale of both Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci.
2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In 2006, Ms Ku¨cu¨kdeveci was dismissed with one-month notice by her employer, for
whom she had been employed for more than ten years, since the age of 18.
She challenged the legality of her dismissal before the Labour Court, alleging a
violation of EU law. In her view, the rule of the German Civil Code (BGB6) pursuant
to which the employer could provide her with a shorter notice, only because she had
starting working before being 25,7 was discriminatory and bereft of a reasonable justifica-
tion. Accordingly, the local court should have disregarded it and ruled for the dismissal’s
illegality.
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age (a specification of the general
principle of equal treatment) has been deemed by the ECJ to qualify as a general principle
of the Union (see below) and was codified in the Directive, which lays down a general
framework for combating discrimination in the area of employment. The EU prohibition of
discrimination, therefore, stems at once from a primary and a secondary source of EU law.
The principle stipulates that no measure shall unjustifiably discriminate between per-
sons in the same conditions solely on grounds of age. The Directive replicates this
faithfully,8 specifying that it applies also to all persons in the private sectors, even in relation
to employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay.9
<http://adjudicatingeurope.eu/?p¼377>. Among the first case notes, see A. Wiesbrock, German Law Journal 11, no. 5
(2010): 539–550, the excellent comment of V. Sciarabba, ‘La Sentenza Ku¨cu¨kdeveci e le Prospettive della Giustizia
Costituzionale Europea’, paper for the Conference of the Gruppo di Pisa, 4–5 Jun. 2010, and the case note of
G. Thu¨sing & S. Holler, Common Market Law Review 47 (2010): 1161–1172.
5 Some aspects of the judgment lie outside the scope of this note and will not be discussed in spite of their
controversial nature. Namely this discussion shall not tackle the ECJ’s rejection of the German defence on grounds of
policy choices (to which the first question of the Labour Tribunal refers), the issue of the existence of the general principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of age, and the possible retroactive effect of the Charter of Human Rights (sketched in
para. 22 of the judgment).
6 Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch.
7 Under Art. 622(2) of the BGB, the period of notice of termination that employers are required to observe
increases with the length of service. However, the provision stipulates that ‘in calculating the length of employment’ for
the purpose of identifying the corresponding period of notice, ‘periods prior to the completion of the employee’s 25th
year of age are not taken into account’. Accordingly, since Ms Ku¨cu¨kdeveci had been employed only three years after
turning 25, she was not accorded the period of notice provided by law for a ten-year employment (four months) but that
connected to a less than quinquennial relationship (one month).
8 Article 2 of the Directive reads, in the relevant part: ‘ . . . the ‘‘principle of equal treatment’’ shall mean that there
shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1’, that is, religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.
9 Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive.
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3. THE MANGOLD PRECEDENT
A few words on Mangold, a preliminary ruling dating late 2006, are necessary to provide
some context to Ku¨cu¨kdeveci.10 In the main proceedings, Mr Mangold had argued (inci-
dentally, with his employee’s consent) that the German statutory provision allowing the
unrestricted conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts with older employees (aged
over 52)11 was incompatible with the Directive, insofar as it constituted an unjustifiable
discrimination on grounds of age.12 Indeed, this constituted an exception to the general
rule, whereby employers were normally subject to a duty to state the reasons why they had
opted for a fixed-term employment contract.
The legal setting of the Mangold case differs from Ku¨cu¨kdeveci in at least one aspect.
Namely, at the time of the controversy, the period for the Directive’s transposition had not
yet expired. Accordingly, the claim of EC incompatibility was even narrower than in
Ku¨cu¨kdeveci: the challenged provision was alleged to violate an instrument that had not
entered into force and, therefore, had very limited legal effects.13
The ECJ negotiated around this difficulty14 ruling that the principle of non-discrimination
on grounds of age must . . . be regarded as a general principle of Community law.15 Since the
challenged measure was taken to implement a directive16 AQ3– the ECJ argued – it fell under
the sphere of EC competences, even before the end of the transposition period. The state
of the Directive, it followed, was irrelevant.17
After the bold statement regarding the existence of the general principle, the ECJ
reasoned as follows: since EC (primary) law provides for legal protection against discrimi-
nation, national judges are called to ensure this protection irrespective of any interfering
national provision.18
This ruling was controversial especially insofar as it relied on the existence of the
general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age without providing a con-
vincing reasoning on how the ECJ had ‘found’ it.19 Since the ECJ appeared to ‘fabricate’
10 See Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Ru¨diger Helm (Mangold) [2005] ECR I-9981, where the ECJ answered the
preliminary questions raised by the Labour Tribunal of Mu¨nchen.
11 Namely Art. 14 of the Act on Part Time and Fixed Term Employment (Teilzeit – und Befristungsgesetz – TzBfG).
12 Mangold, para. 78.
13 Ibid., paras 28 and 67.
14 As rightly argued by Advocate General Maza´k in the Opinion of 15 Feb. 2007 in Case C-411/05, Fe´lix Palacios
de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA (‘Palacios’), para. 80.
15 Mangold, para. 74.
16 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 Jun. 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work
concluded by ETUC, UNICE, and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, 43).
17 Mangold, para. 76: ‘observance of the general principle of equal treatment, in particular in respect of age, cannot
as such be conditional upon the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for the transposition of a directive
intended to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of age’. In holding the general
principle as the applicable provision in this case, the ECJ followed the suggestion of the Advocate General Tizzano, see
paras 84 and 101 of the Opinion.
18 Ibid., para. 77, referring to the landmark decision in Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para. 21.
19 At para. 74, the ECJ refers to the Preamble of the Directive: ‘the source of the actual principle underlying the
prohibition of those forms of discrimination being found, as is clear from the third and fourth recitals in the preamble to
the directive, in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’.
In particular, the cursory reference to the common constitutional traditions was misplaced, according to many commen-
tators, because in fact only the Finnish and Portuguese constitutions actually spell out that principle.
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this principle, and no other binding EC norm could be used to set aside the German
provision, the decision sprouted discontent,20 and a certain belief that the severe Lissabon-
Urteil judgment21 represented a first retaliatory response of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(BvG) to the ECJ, to which the decision on the same Mangold case22 – that was pending
before the BvG23 – has recently followed, yet without the disruptive effects that many
feared.
4. FROM MANGOLD TO KU¨CU¨KDEVECI
After Mangold, the Court was repeatedly called to pronounce upon the principle of non-
discrimination. As it has been noticed, the Advocate Generals systematically tried to
distinguish these cases from Mangold, so as to avoid the relevance of its reasoning.24
In any event, the Court has not deemed necessary to elucidate the extent of the principle,
and in the Palacios case, it applied the Directive directly (it was a vertical dispute, and the
period for transposition had expired).
The enflamed debate on the Mangold precedent, apparently, confused the percep-
tion of the applicable law in the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci case. The referring court, in its first question,
was not sure whether the EU standard of review was primary Community law or [the]
Directive. This doubt is reflected also in the first part of the second question, whose
inconclusive formulation betrays the real concern of the German judge: should directives
be acknowledged horizontal direct effect and entitle domestic courts to set aside contrary
legislation?
In addition, the Advocate General took this concern very seriously and drafted a
lengthy opinion advocating a change in the ECJ’s case law, virtually supporting the
20 This decision was famously criticized by former German President Roman Herzog and Lu¨der Gerken, see ‘Stop
the European Court of Justice: Competences of Member States Are Being Undermined. The Increasingly Questionable
Judgments from Luxemburg Suggest a Need for a Judicial Watchdog’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 Sep. 2008,
<www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Pressemappe/CEP_in_den_Medien/Herzog-EuGH-Webseite_eng.pdf> (in English).
Likewise, an incendiary editorial note in the Common Market Law Review (see CML Rev. (2006): 1–8) criticized the
ECJ for having undermined the cohesion of the doctrine of direct effect. See also Advocate Maza´k’s opinion in Palacios,
paras 84, 89, and 97, and Advocate Geelhoed’s opinion in Case C-13/05, Sonia Chaco´n Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA
[2006] ECR I-6467, para. 56. See also M. Schmidt, ‘The Principle of Non-discrimination in Respect of Age: Dimensions
of the ECJ’s Mangold Judgment’, German Law Journal 7 (2006): 505–524, 520.
21 Judgment of 30 Jun. 2009, BVerfG No. 2/08, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/
es20090630_2bve000208en.html> (in English).
22 See C.F. Sabel & O. Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence
of a Co-ordinate Constitutional Order’, European Law Journal 5 (2010): 511–550, 547: ‘it is conceivable that the BVG,
especially in the light of the Lisbon, . . . could take the occasion of its pending review of the Mangold to articulate a Solange
III doctrine, according to which it reserves the right to intervene not only when the ECJ ignores altogether consideration
of fundamental rights, but also when the ECJ imposes its own interpretation of such rights in complete disregard of
legitimate national diversity in their interpretation’.
23 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2661/06, <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/
rs20100706_2bvr266106.html> (only in German). In this judgment, the BvG has ruled that the Mangold decision did
not amount to an ultra vires act by the ECJ. However, the German judges were careful in avoiding to pronounce on the
correctness of the ECJ’s legal reasoning in that decision.
24 See Wiesbrock, supra, 547, referring to Case C-427/06, Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgera¨te (BSH) Alter-
sfu¨rsorge GmbH [2008] ECR I-7245, Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bu¨hnen [2008] ECR
I-1757, and Palacios, supra.
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possibility that certain directives might have direct effects or at least trigger disapplication in
private disputes.25
Since in the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci case (as opposed to Mangold) the period of transposition of the
Directive had expired,26 the matter of workplace discriminations has since then fallen
squarely under EU competence.
This aspect might have invited some into relying upon a simplified reading. Since in
Ku¨cu¨kdeveci the Directive has certainly deeper effects than it had in Mangold, the ECJ’s
ruling27 has inspired the widely held impression that the Directive in the meanwhile has
‘ripened’, so as to achieve direct effects and legitimize disapplication. Even the Advocate
General indulged in this a fortiori reasoning to introduce his proposal.28
Even a cursory glance to the decision will reveal the weakness of this impression.
Indeed, the ECJ was careful in reaffirming that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on
an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual.29 Moreover, the ECJ
excluded that a consistent interpretation of the BGB could solve the contrast with EU
law30 and stated that the Directive merely gives expression to, but does not lay down, the principle
of equal treatment in employment and occupation.31
25 See paras 87–90 of the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci opinion. Advocate Bot refers to the distinction between a ‘substitution’ direct
effect that makes an EU norm directly applicable and an ‘exclusion’ effect that merely renders the conflicting national
provision inapplicable. It is on the basis of this distinction that he reinsures the ECJ that the national provision should be
set aside even without having to overrule the established principles regarding the effectiveness of the directives in disputes
between individuals. On this distinction, see s. 8 infra.
26 Indeed, Germany had passed in due course (14 Aug. 2006) the General Law on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, BGBl. 2006 I, 1897), whose para. 10 faithfully replicates the rule of Art. 6(1)(a) of the Directive,
allowing for reasonable departures from the general rule of Art. 3 thereof, including those promoting the protection of
older workers in termination procedures. As Sciarabba acutely notes (supra, 6), the Labour Tribunal could have simply
deemed Art. 622(2) BGB to be implicitly superseded by the statute implementing the Directive (lex posterior), since the
wording of Art. 6(1)(a) of the Directive and of para. 10 of the German Act are virtually identical. Accordingly, the
Tribunal could have simply disposed of the controversy applying the domestic law. Indeed, it would be difficult to claim
that such a verbatim replication of the provision might constitute an instance of incomplete or inappropriate implementa-
tion, requiring the interpreter to look at the potential direct effect of the Directive. See ibid. for a deeper analysis on this
paradox.
27 That national courts must ensure that ‘the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression
in Directive 2000/78, is complied with, disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national legislation’, see
Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 51.
28 See paras 86 and 87 of the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci opinion: ‘[t]he Court must now decide whether it wishes to maintain the
[Mangold] approach for situations which arose after the expiry of the time-limit for the transposition of Directive 2000/78.
In my opinion, it should do so, because to adopt another position would depart from the logic which underlies
Mangold. . . . It cannot be accepted that the protection of individuals against discrimination which is contrary to Com-
munity law is reduced after the expiry of that period even though the purpose of the rule in question is to increase their
protection. To my mind, therefore, it should be possible to rely on Directive 2000/78 in proceedings between private
parties in order to exclude a national provision which is contrary to Community law’. See also how Wiesbrock, supra,
540, summarizes the AG’s position regarding the applicable law: ‘[t]he AG reiterated that the case arose after the expiry of
the time-limit for implementing Directive 2000/78. Subsequently, he identified the Directive as the applicable legal
framework to assess the existence of age discrimination in employment matters’. See also Sciarabba, supra, 2.
29 Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 46. For a clear formulation of this doctrine and an overview of the case law, see Case C-80/06,
Carp [2007] ECR I 4473, para. 20.
30 Ibid., para. 49.
31 Ibid., para. 50. See also para. 20. Note that the French version of this passage is less clear, as it reads ‘la directive
2000/78 ne fait que concre´tiser, sans le consacrer, le principe’.
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5. MANGOLD II: DIRECT EFFECTS RELOAD
The ECJ’s answer to the first part of the second question is, therefore, a mere rehearsal of
Mangold: since a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age exists –
regardless of the Directive – national courts must ensure its protection, disapplying national
conflicting provisions.
This ruling of the ECJ neither adds to nor diminishes Mangold. Direct horizontal
effects are acknowledged as part of the general principle of equal treatment (see below),32
not the Directive. The only residual clarification must address the continuous use by the
ECJ of the formula of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in
Directive 2000/78, in which the Directive seems to play, at least, some role in tandem with
the principle.
This coupling is only a hermeneutic short cut.33 Generally, the content of principles
has to be ‘found’ by the ECJ, and typically the appropriate methodology to follow is a
matter of debate.34 In Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, however, this task was facilitated by the existence of the
Directive, a` la Defrenne. Indeed, the Directive’s purpose is precisely to give specific expres-
sion35 to the general principle and to put it into effect in the Member States.36 In other words,
although it was not applicable in the dispute, the Directive inescapably nails down the
content of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, which, in turn, is
applicable in itself.37
Prospectively, it has been noticed that this principle directive combination might
become, in the future, a sort of ‘complex normative figure’, capable of being invoked in
particular when its first component (the principle) is listed in the Charter.38
32 On the discussion on whether not even the general principle was recognized a ‘real horizontal direct effect’, but
only an ‘invocabilite´ d’exclusion’, and on the possible reasons behind this possibility, see s. 8 infra.
33 Sciarabba, supra, 9–10, holds a different view, purporting that the reference to the directive is either redundant (in
case the principle is applicable directly) or insufficient (if, on the contrary, the principle cannot be applied in and of itself).
34 It would be sufficient here to recall the criticism raised after Mangold, but see more generally – on the difficult task of
creating general principles by means of a particular comparative methodology – J.H.H. Weiler & N. Lockhart, ‘Taking Rights
Seriously: The European Court of Justice and Its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’, Common Market Law Review (1995):
51–92 and 579–627; X. Groussot, General Principles of Community Law (Gronigen: ELP, 2006), in particular, 10–11 (‘principles
do not fall from heaven’). See also Rodrı´guez Iglesias, ‘Reflections on the General Principles of Community Law’, in
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (1999), 1–16. In addition, Advocate Maza´k, in the opinion of Palacios, supra,
acknowledged that ‘it lies in the nature of general principles of law, which are to be sought rather in the Platonic heaven of
law than in the law books, that both their existence and their substantive content are marked by uncertainty’ (para. 86).
35 Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 21, mentioning, by analogy, the precedent in Case 43/75, Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, para. 54:
‘This directive provides further details regarding certain aspects of the material scope [of the principle of equal pay]’.
36 Article 1 of the Directive, as reported in para. 4.
37 Likewise, in the field of public international law, it is commonly held that ‘rules contained in a treaty will also be
binding as a matter of customary law if the treaty is codificatory of customs’; Bing Bing Jia, ‘The Relations between Treaties
and Custom’, Chinese Journal of International Law 9 (2010): 81–109, 92. See also E. Jime´nez de Are´chaga, ‘International Law in
the Past Third of a Century’, Recueil des Cours 159 (1978): 1, 14–22. On the role of international principles in international
law, this view corresponds to the normative reading of general principles, which acknowledges their axiomatic and binding
force (see, for instance, the discussion in T. Meron, ‘International Law in the Age of Human Rights – General Course of
Public International Law’, Recueil des Cours 301 (2004): 404–408). Contra, G. Schwarzenberger, advocating for a descriptive
theory of general principles, which rejects their value as rules, see The Inductive Approach to International Law (London:
Steven & Sons, 1965), 50–51: ‘Whenever legal rules are deducted from first principles, the magician’s hat trick is applied’.
38 See Sciarabba, supra, 5. The correctness of this remark, however, should not misguide: in the Court’s view, the
principle deserves direct horizontal application in itself, regardless of the directive’s support (whose function, in fact, is
rather to flag the regulated matter as falling within the EU’s competence, see infra).
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The reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter), although somewhat
out of focus, has also a strong hermeneutic function. The ruling just notices – in passing –
that the principle of non-discrimination of grounds of age is enshrined in the Charter
(Article 21, first paragraph), and that under Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), the Charter is as binding as are the Treaties.39
This apodictic statement proves maybe too much, suggesting some sort of retroactivity
(the new TEU entered into force in December 2009, almost two years after the Labour
Tribunal lodged the preliminary question). However, it also proves too little in that it does
not clarify the Charter’s importance in supporting the existence of the general principle.40
Among the few undisputed effects of the (formerly) non-binding Charter, indeed, one is
that it represents a privileged instrument for identifying fundamental rights41 and certainly
for identifying a fundamental right as a general principle of Community law.42 Arguably, the
Charter can be used to supplement principles of law already recognized in binding legal norms and
contribute to their broader interpretation.43 Accordingly, the ECJ could have clarified that
Article 21(1) of the Charter had been useful in supplementing and specifying the general
principle or equal treatment, pointing to the principle of non-discrimination on the
grounds of age.44
Like the Directive, the Charter is a legal instrument that is not directly applicable in
the main proceedings. However, they both contribute in shaping the content of the general
principle, producing the optical illusion that they are applied instead.
6. SIMMENTHAL II: SUPREMACY RELOAD
The ECJ’s answer to the second part of the second question was straightforward. The judge
had drawn a comparison between the domestic procedure of constitutional review and the
39 Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 22.
40 An aspect in relation to which the Court ought to have provided a more detailed reasoning, in light of his very
controversial nature. See, for example, the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-427/06, Baruch v. Bosch und
Siemens Hausgerute (BSH) Altersfursorge GmbH [2009] 1 CMLR 5, para. 65: ‘the general principle of equality operates in
certain circumstances so as to prohibit discrimination based on age, but that there was not, ab initio, a separate, detailed
principle of Community law that always prohibited discrimination on grounds of age’.
41 Under this perspective, the conservative content of the Charter accounts for higher reliability: if a right is listed
therein, it is likely to be undisputedly acknowledged by all Member States. As Groussot, supra, 107, noted, the Charter is
deemed to be a ‘show case of existing rights’. See also, for instance, Advocate General Le´ger’s opinion in the Case C-353/
99, Council of the European Union v. Heidi Hautala (Hautala) [2001] ECR I-9565, para. 80: ‘aside from any consideration
regarding its legislative scope, the nature of the rights set down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes it from
being regarded as a mere list of purely moral principles without any consequences. It should be noted that those values
have in common the fact of being unanimously shared by the Member States, which have chosen to make them more
visible by placing them in a charter in order to increase their protection’.
42 See Groussot, supra, 113. See also the statement of the Court, in Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council [2006]
ECR I-05769, para. 38: ‘the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from its preamble, is to reaffirm rights as they
result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the
Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted by the Community and
by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court . . . and of the European Court of Human Rights’.
43 See T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 362.
44 Similarly, M.P. Maduro suggests that the Charter may help the ECJ to tighten its judicial review of measures
affecting fundamental rights with respect to certain categories of parameters (such as those determined by age); see
‘The Double Constitutional Life of the Charter’, in Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights –
a Legal Perspective, eds T.K. Hervey & J. Kenner (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 269–300, 280.
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preliminary reference machinery. In Germany – the Labour Tribunal contended – ordinary
judges are not allowed to autonomously disapply a national provision on grounds of
unconstitutionality but have to wait for the BvG to strike it down; the only way for judges
not to apply what they regard as an unconstitutional statute is to lodge a constitutionality
question. Similarly, the Labour Court wondered, national courts should have to wait for
the ECJ to pronounce on the EU incompatibility of a national provision, before being
entitled to disapply the latter.
As the Advocate General had argued, there should be no room for similar doubts, at
least after Simmenthal.45 The ECJ simply noted that the right (or obligation) to raise a
preliminary reference and the obligation to set aside EU-incompatible domestic norms are
not codependent; therefore, courts must disapply without being preliminarily either com-
pelled to make or prevented from making a reference to the ECJ.46 It then invalidated the parallel
with the German procedure, charitably avoiding – unlike Advocate Bot – to include an
explicit reference to Simmenthal.47
Although the answer was predictable, it was not without importance. Indeed, the ECJ
took the chance to specify the unfettered supremacy enjoyed (even) by EU general
principles over domestic legal systems, regardless of the potential ‘lateral’ support of other
sources of primary or secondary law (if the Charter was not binding, then the Directive
could not apply).
7. THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Early comments saw in this ruling the capitulation of the ECJ with respect to the recogni-
tion of horizontal direct effects to (certain) directives. This may partly be due to the fact
that expectations in this respect were very high, also because the doctrine that has so far
prevented the ECJ from making this move is of judicial origin and could therefore be
overruled with relatively lesser effort.48
Arguably, the focus of this ruling is rather on the general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age. For the sake of ease, we assume that the Mangold
reasoning is sufficient in justifying its existence,49 and we dwell upon the issue of its effects.
45 See the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci opinion, para. 55: ‘I do not think that the latter question calls for a lengthy discussion. It has
been clear since the Simmenthal judgment [that the answer is in the negative]’.
46 Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 53.
47 In fact, the ECJ referred only to Mangold (which, in turn, quoted Simmenthal), showing a clear willingness to
legitimize, and foster the settlement of, its controversial reasoning.
48 As noted by P.Y. Monjal, Recherches sur la Hierarchie des norms Communautaires (Paris: LGDJ, 2000), 509: ‘cette
diffe´renciation [entre re`glements et dire´ctives] restera solide aussi longtemps que la Cour la jugera ne´cessaire’.
49 We note that Advocate General Le´ger has proposed a third way to identify a general principle of the EC (beside
the analysis of common constitutional traditions of the Member States and the study of international instruments), in his
opinion in the Hautala case. In particular, he noted that to identify a general principle ‘[i]t may suffice that Member States
have a common approach to the right in question demonstrating the same desire to provide protection, even where the
level of that protection and the procedure for affording it are provided for differently in the various Member States’
(para. 69). Following this method even the controversial general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age may
prove easier to establish.
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Although the scholarship has not sufficiently pondered this question (at least, it has done it
infinitely less than with respect to directives), it might well be that, in fact, general
principles should not have horizontal direct effects either.50 This contribution intends to
explore this issue, encouraged by the recent remark by AG AQ4Kokott.
51
At first glance, it seems like the issue is relatively novel, primarily because general
principles typically emerge in a context where the guarantees of the individual vis-a`-vis the
public powers are at stake. In other words, they have been historically formulated so as to
bestow on private parties rights rather than enforceable obligations. In addition, general
principles typically serve an auxiliary scope: they point at the interpretation of a certain
norm, among all the possible ones, that ought to be preferred.52
In the absence of indications in the Treaties,53 the historical origin and purpose of the
general principles suggest a negative answer to the question of whether they have hor-
izontal effects.54 It is even possible to point at cases in which the ECJ has denied the
application of certain general principles in controversies between private parties55 but that
would not necessarily imply that no general principle can ever have horizontal effects.
In fact, with the blurring of the public/private divide and the rise of fundamental
human rights as general principles (along with the long-established procedural ones), failure
to protect individuals from the violation of certain principles on the part of other private
parties might frustrate the overall effectiveness of the system of rights protection set up by
the EU.
This has been recognized to some extent with respect to Treaty provisions. Suffice it
here to recall a passage of Angonese:
the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in
compliance with the obligations thus laid down (see Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] ECR 455,
par. 31). Such considerations must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty [on
50 In the following, we will discuss the reasoning of Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci at once since, as shown supra, in the
latter case the ECJ merely applied the holding of the former.
51 ‘Il serait certes tentant de proce´der a` une re´capitulation et a` un examen approfondis du fondement doctrinal de l’effet direct
horizontal, controverse´, de principes ge´ne´raux du droit ou de droits fondamentaux entre particuliers’; see the opinion of the AG in
Case C-499/08, Ole Andersen, filed on 6 May 2010, para. 23.
52 This would imply, with respect to the relationship between domestic law and the general principles of the EU, a
machinery similar to the obligation of consistent interpretation. See AG Kokott’s comment on the use of general
principles in Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, in ‘The Basic Law at 60 – From 1949 to 2009: The Basic Law and Supranational
Integration’, German Law Journal 11 (2010): 99–111. Kokott remarks that EU general principles play a hermeneutic role
within domestic systems and highlights how their direct application might have momentous consequences: ‘In any case,
the application of fundamental rights between private citizens is a delicate topic because it gives great power to
Constitutional Courts – in this case, also to the ECJ – and strengthens their influence on the ordinary law, which, in
general, is the domain of the ordinary courts’.
53 After all, general principles are an interpretative by-product of Art. 220 TEC, now transplanted in Art. 19 of the
new TEU.
54 See Tridimas, supra, 47.
55 See, for instance, Case C-60/92, Otto v. Postbank NV [1993] ECR I-5683, para. 16: ‘[w]here, as in the main
proceedings, a procedure is involved which concerns exclusively private relations between individuals and cannot lead
directly or indirectly to the imposition of a penalty by a public authority, Community law does not require a party to be
granted the right not to give answers which might entail admission of the existence of an infringement of the competition
rules. That guarantee is essentially intended to protect an individual against measures of investigation ordered by public
authorities to obtain his admission of the existence of conduct laying him open to administrative or criminal penalties’.
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discrimination on grounds of nationality], which . . . is designed to ensure that there is no discrimina-
tion on the labour market.56
This rationale could apply, with certain necessary changes, to certain general principles and
with particular force to those deriving from that of equal treatment, regardless of their
specification in the Treaties. This would be the case with the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age ‘discovered’ in Mangold,57 where the ECJ did what it
had not been able or willing to do in Bostock, a case in which it contemplated the direct
application of various general principles (protection of property, equal treatment, unjust
enrichment) in a controversy between individuals but ended up excluding it.58
Arguably, the judicial creation of a new set of unwritten obligations on private
subjects hardly reconciles itself with the values of legal certainty and results in a scenario
where individuals are held liable for the failure of their States to comply with the duty to
implement EU law in keeping with the general principles of law.59
8. INCIDENTAL HORIZONTAL EFFECTS
In sum, much of the debate regarding the horizontal effect of the directives replicates with
respect to (uncodified) general principles, with an ironic twist, since legal certainty and
protection of legitimate expectations are, in and of themselves, general principles of the
EU.60
Short of taking a definitive position on the horizontal effectiveness of both directives
and general principles, we intend to provide a brief description of the middle way
represented by the doctrine of incidental horizontal effects, which was developed mainly
with respect to directives.61
56 Case C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA (Angonese) [2000] ECR I-4139,
paras 34–35.
57 Note that in his Ku¨cu¨kdeveci opinion Advocate Bot, although supporting the horizontal effect of the general
principle in and of itself, has not being able to provide other precedents than those where principles or fundamental rights
that the ECJ were applied in horizontal relationship were in fact enshrined in Treaty provisions. See para. 85, mentioning
the Defrenne, Angonese, and the more recent Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation e Finnish Seamen’s
Union [2007] ECR I-10779.
58 See also Case C-2/92, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Dennis Clifford Bostock
[1994] ECR I-955, paras 18–27. See, in particular, para. 26: ‘legal relations between lessees and lessors, in particular on the
expiry of a lease, are, as Community law now stands, still governed by the law of the Member State in question. Any
consequences of unjust enrichment of the lessor on the expiry of a lease are therefore not a matter for Community law’.
59 It is undisputed that States, when they act as agents of the EU, are constrained by those obligations limiting the
actions of EU bodies, including that of compliance with the general principles. See the Commentary to the Charter
prepared by the Praesidium of the Convention as regards the prohibition of discrimination set forth in Art. 21:
‘it . . . addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred
under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law’ (Explanations Relating to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Document 2007/C 303/02).
60 Moreover, the EU constitutional attitude with respect to private law in the Member States is complex:
harmonization has to be reconciled with respect for national diversity and constitutional traditions, which is in itself a
principle of EU public law. See E.U. Petersmann, ‘Constitutional Justice and the Perennial Task of ‘‘Constitutionalizing’’
Law and Society through Participatory Justice’, EUI Working Paper 2010/3, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/
1814/13590/1/LAW_2010_03.pdf>.
61 For an accurate overview of this theory, see P.V. Figueroa Regueiro, ‘Invocability of Substitution and
Invocability of Exclusion: Bringing Legal Realism to the Current Developments of the Case Law of ‘‘Horizontal’’ Direct
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According to this doctrine, the directives cannot dispose of a claim between indivi-
duals and substitute the applicable EU-implementing domestic law, but they can exclude its
application, serving as a touchstone62 of EU consistency.63 There were cases in which the
ECJ seemingly adopted this rationale in a limited manner as in the Unilever case64 or more
robustly (although apodictically) as in the Berna´ldez65 and Bellone66 cases. Advocate Saggio
borrowed from the scholarship an effective conceptualization of the problem:
Si le juge national ( . . . ) ne peut se substituer a` lautorite´ de transposition, rien ne lui interdit en
revanche de´carter lapplication dune re`gle nationale incompatible avec une norme qui lui est hie´r-
archiquement supe´rieure en vertu du principe de primaute´.67
Note that the ECJ ruled that the directives’ compulsory effects may be applied by national
courts also when they were not raised by the parties.68 It follows that individuals’ protec-
tion through EU remedies is a matter of public law, trumping procedural niceties: in other
words, a matter of supremacy. The classic concept of direct effects fails to account for this
tension, and Advocate Le´ger already ten years ago campaigned for its abandonment, in
favour of a notion encompassing exclusionary effects.69
Effect of Directives’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/02, <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/
02/020701.pdf>.
62 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 234.
63 In the words of P. Craig & G. de Bu´rca, EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 271: ‘a directive can preclude reliance
on a provision of national law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the directive even in an action between private
parties. This is premised on the primacy of Community law and entails a distinction between a directive having an
‘‘exclusionary’’ impact, which in effect connotes the idea that the directive ‘‘knocks out’’ or ‘‘excludes’’ inconsistent
national law; and a directive having a ‘‘substitution’’ effect, which connotes the idea that the directive will in itself
mandate certain novel EC legal consequences within the national legal order’. The distinction between invocabilite´
d’exclusion and invocabilite´ de substitution is discussed at some length in Prechal, supra, 235, 267–268. The use of principles
to review the legality of EU-implementing national provisions in vertical disputes has been repeatedly confirmed; see, for
instance, Joined Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95, and C-47/96, Garage Molenheide BVBA et al. v. Belgische Staat
[1997] ECR I-7281, where the ECJ ruled that national measures implementing EC acts can be reviewed on grounds of
proportionality or, if they adversely affect the right of judicial review, can accordingly be set aside by the domestic courts.
64 For an extensive overview of the relevant case law, see Figueroa Regueiro, supra. In Case C-443/98, Unilever
Italia SpA v. Central Food SpA (Unilever) [2000] ECR I-7535, para. 51, the ECJ laid down a principle for relying on a
Directive in proceedings between individuals, although it cared not to extend this reasoning unconditionally to every case
of non-transposition a` la Faccini Dori: ‘Directive 83/189 does not in any way define the substantive scope of the legal rule
on the basis of which the national court must decide the case before it. It creates neither rights nor obligations for
individuals’.
65 Case C-129/94, Criminal Proceedings against Rafael Ruiz Berna´ldez [1996] ECR I-1829, para. 24. For a comment,
see J. Stuyck, Note to Cases C-192/94 El Corte Ingle´s, C-129/94 Berna´ldez, C-441/93 Panagis Pafitis, Common Market Law
Review (1996): 1261–1272.
66 Case C-215/97, Bellone v. Yokohama SpA [1998] ECR I-2191, para. 18.
67 Opinion to Joined Cases C-240 to 244/98, Oce´ano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio´ Murciano Quintero (Oce´ano) [2000]
ECR I-4941, para. 30, n. 17. Quotation taken from D. Simon, La directive europe´enne (Parigi, 1997), 4. Our translation:
‘even if the national judge cannot substitute herself for the authority in charge of transposition, nothing prevents her from
setting aside the application of a national rule, if it is incompatible with a norm that is superior by virtue of the supremacy
principle’.
68 Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996]
ECR I-5403, paras 58–60.
69 Case C-287/98, Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v. Berthe Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paras 81–82 of the AG’s
opinion: ‘there is no need for prior consideration of the direct effect of the provisions relied on, at least in the sense in
which the term ‘‘direct effect’’ is understood. It must thus be possible to exercise rights contained in a directive that has
not been transposed, irrespective of the terms in which they are couched, where they are invoked for the purposes of
reviewing the legality of rules of domestic law’. See M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), 113.
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This evolution might have inspired the ECJ in Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci: courts should
have simply used the general principle – the ECJ said – to set aside national discriminatory
provisions, which would have otherwise governed the issue.70 The dispute, then, would
have been resolved applying the default rules of national law.71
9. A COMMENT ON KU¨CU¨KDEVECI
As anticipated, we have not dealt with the ECJ’s particular reasoning on the compatibility
between EU law and the BGB’s exception. It is based on a circumstantial analysis of that
exception’s rationale and of the policy underpinning it; the outcome could have been
different and still leave our analysis intact. In fact, in a preliminary ruling handed down the
week before Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, the ECJ had found another German measure providing for age-
related restrictions to be perfectly compatible with the principle of Article 3(1) of the
Directive.72 The ECJ has shown reasonableness when it had to review state policies.73
The added systemic value of the ruling was rather in how it dealt with the effects of
the general principle in the domestic framework, strengthening the Mangold doctrine and
building upon the original sin that lied therein (the controversial principle reconstruction
that was carried out at variance with the traditional methods). The impact of this doctrine is
apparent and AGs already wonder which specification of the non-discrimination principle
will be next to being acknowledged direct effect.74
We have repeatedly argued that this ruling’s innovative element is not much about the
directives as it is about EU general principles. Moreover, the Simmenthal-like answer given
to the referring judge and the substitution effect acknowledged to the general principle
suggest that this ruling is also more about supremacy than about direct effect.75
A conclusive word of realism and caution is needed, departing from the technical
tenor of the reflections offered above. From December 2009, States are obliged to ensure
70 See X. Groussot & H.H. Lindgard, ‘Are There General Principles of Community Law Affecting Private Law?’,
in General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, eds U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius & C. Cardner (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
2008), 173. See also J.H. Jans, ‘The Effect in National Legal Systems of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of
Age as a General Principle of Community Law’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2007): 53–66, 61 (referring to the
precedent Case C-194/94, CIA Security v. Signalson [1996] ECR I-2201 and Unilever).
71 In the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci main proceedings, for instance, the disapplication of the Art. 622(2) exception would have
allowed the application of Art. 622(1) BGB.
72 Namely German law prohibited persons older than 30 to apply for an intermediate position in the professional
fire services, with the purpose of granting – on average – a lengthier and more efficient service. See the judgment of
12 Jan. 2010 in Case C-229/08, Colin Wolf v. Stadt Frankfurt am Main, nyp, para. 46.
73 Moreover, as noticed by Wiesbrock, supra, 546, the Court tends to frame its review on a proportionality
assessment (as it was the case in Ku¨cu¨kdeveci) rather than on the abstract propriety of the objective pursued by the national
measure challenged.
74 See the opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-104/09, Roca A´lvarez v. Sesa Start Espan˜a ETT SA, paras 54–55 (on
the prohibition of sex-based discrimination).
75 See Advocate Saggio’s opinion in Oce´ano, supra, para. 17: ‘Certes, lanalyse propose´e suppose un de´couplage entre effet
directe et primaute´, mais cette dissociation paraıˆt pre´cise´ment constituer lun des axes dominants de le´volution re´cente de la jurisprudence de
la Cour de justice comme des juridictions nationales’. Our translation: ‘Granted, this analysis implies a distinction between direct
effect and supremacy, but this division seems to represent precisely one of the dominant features of the recent
development in the case-law of the ECJ as well as of national jurisdictions’.
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the protection of Charter’s rights when implementing EU law.76 Why should individuals
not engage State liability for failure to do so under the Francovich test?77 However, even
more directly, individuals could rely on the Defrenne reasoning, since the Treaty-like
condition of the Charter allows them to do that. Then, the careful distinction between
the principles’ substitution and exclusionary effect would lose relevance.
In retrospect, Ku¨cu¨kdeveci is as little about a ‘new’ power of the directives as was
Defrenne. In fact, they are both about a primary source (respectively, a general principle, a
Treaty provision). This has turned into reality after the entry into effect of the Lisbon
Treaty – limitedly to those general principles that are enlisted in the Charter – and the
prophetic remark of the Charter preamble ([e]njoyment of these rights entails responsibilities) has
started to prove true.78
10. A LESSON OF SOLIDARITY?
The first lesson of Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci is that the prohibition of unjustifiable discri-
mination applies also to private employers, regardless of the content of domestic law.
In prospect, this assumption means that all unjustified discriminatory measures will be
gradually struck down, as well as those whose justification will not pass EU scrutiny.
Due to space constraints, this essay deliberately fails to dwell upon the merits of the
case, that is, the actual instance of discrimination challenged before the national judges and,
eventually, the ECJ. The Court has deemed that the distinction drawn by the German
legislator, depending on the age at which the employment was started, was not reasonable,
using a good deal of common sense.79
Although perhaps it is too early to assess the effects of the Mangold/Ku¨cu¨kdeveci
doctrine (general principles have direct horizontal effects), it is appropriate to consider
the new phenomenon of individuals being responsible for discharging general non-
discrimination EU obligations of which other individuals are the beneficiaries.
76 See Case 230/78, Eridania [1979] ECR 3477, para. 31: ‘the general principles of Community law . . . are binding
on all authorities entrusted with the implementation of Community provisions’. See also Case C-309/96, Annibaldi v.
Sindaco di Guidonia [1997] ECR I-7493, para. 19, referring to Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85, Klensch and Others v.
Secre´taire d’E´tat [1986] ECR 3477, para. 8.
77 See Joined Cases C-6 and C-9/90, Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, para. 37. See also para. 4 of Case
C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325. In such a post-Lisbon scenario, the like of Ms Ku¨cu¨kdeveci and Mr
Mangold would be entitled, even if German courts refused to set aside German law in favour of the general principle, to
claim compensation, because by not bringing Art. 622(2) BGB or Art. 14(3) TzBfG into EU compliance, Germany has
violated its mandate to act as an agent of the Union, and such violation would entail an impairment of their rights.
Nonetheless, as noted by Advocate Bot in the Ku¨cu¨kdeveci opinion, this indirect protection would be inappropriate, at least
because it would imply that in the main proceedings these individuals would lose their case (para. 69).
78 J.H.H. Weiler, On the Distinction between Values and Virtues in the Process of European Integration (2010), draft
paper, on file with author.
79 Even admitting that the objective pursued were worthy (namely the limitation of younger employees’ legal
protection to the benefit of older ones, who are less likely to react promptly and effectively to a sudden loss of their job),
still the application of the provision could yield unreasonable results. Indeed, since its application was regardless of the age
at the moment of dismissal, the provision might well be comparatively more detrimental to old employees, only based on
their early start, vis-a`-vis their colleagues of the same age. See Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, para. 30.
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First, the imposition of such duties is not generalized, as it concerns only the general
principles (possibly codified in the directives) and, even more directly, the obligations listed
in the Charter,80 in light of its legal force, likened to the Treaties.
Second, the distinction between vertical and horizontal disputes is far from being
abandoned; quite to the contrary, its relevance is unpredictably expanded. Indeed, both the
general principles and the Charter are effective limitedly to the sphere of competences of
the EU. Accordingly, their horizontal effects will spread in a haphazard fashion, in con-
currence with the extension of the matters governed by EU law, and this will often lead to
a double standard of treatment81 that is difficult to justify.82
These two rulings clarified that, when a general principle applies and the national
provisions are not in compliance therewith, the private defendant will not be able to benefit
from his State’s default, as it is the case when a directive is invoked. That presumption of
innocence (of dualist derivation), implicitly founded on the assumption that subjects
complying with national law cannot be blamed for violating EU law, does not simply
operate.
Intuitively, it is like new shared obligations were established, jointly and severally, on
the States and on ‘damaging’ individuals. Both are liable in full for compensating the
beneficiaries of the EU rights, in case of violation. This may happen either directly, when
national judges disapply the national norm and cause the defeat of the ‘damaging’ private
party, or indirectly, when the beneficiary of the EU right, after having lost in a controversy
resolved in accordance to the national norm, asks for compensation to the State, for its
failure to duly implement EU law.
Truly, the party who is liable and who, as advocated by the ECJ in Mangold and
Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, loses in court due to the State’s default appears to be overly mistreated,
insomuch as his reliance on national law did not remove from him the liability for the
damage that occurred (think of Swedex, the company where Ms Ku¨cu¨kdeveci was
employed: according to the ECJ, they should have borne the consequences of a negative
judgment in the labour proceedings, even if they had done nothing but applying
Article 622(2) BGB).
80 Better, the obligations necessary to the implementation of the Charter’s rights. For instance, the negative
obligation corresponding to the right not to be discriminated on certain grounds.
81 Moreover, as Sciarabba duly notes (supra, 15), the scope of EU competence will often be confirmed by the
existence of a directive, as in Mangold and Ku¨cu¨kdeveci. In other words, when the ordinary judge will disapply a national
provision, he will indeed do so to give priority to a general principle (substantive norm) but almost exclusively when there
is a directive that certifies the supremacy of EU law on a particular subject matter (procedural criterion).
82 This double standard would be less acceptable than the one developed by the ECJ in relation to the effects of
directives (bestowing on the individual’s different claims and rights depending on whether he is opposed in a controversy
against the State or other individuals). See Case 148/78, Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, para. 22: ‘a Member State which has not
adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the prescribed periods may not rely, as against
individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations which the directive entail’. In other words, the State cannot
escape an obligation of EU law by invoking its own negligence; therefore, directives can have direct vertical effect.
Conversely, individual parties, not being responsible for such negligence, cannot be subject to the obligations deriving
from a non-implemented directive (or a directive implemented incorrectly): directives cannot have a horizontal direct
effect.
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This scenario might give rise to various incentives: private parties, to the extent
possible, are prompted to be aware of EU law, knowing that mere compliance with
domestic law may fall short of providing him with a winning case in court. States, on
the other hand, are called to act with increased diligence in implementing EU law, not to
run the risk of exposing their citizens to a set of obligations – vis-a`-vis any other EU
citizen – which they plausibly ignored.
It is still to ascertain whether national judges will accept to embark on the ungrateful
task of punishing their citizens to teach a lesson to their State (by disapplying the national
norm that they deem to be at variance with the Charter, or the general principles) or, more
likely, will resort to a preliminary opinion by the ECJ (see above the second question
raised by the Landesarbeitsgericht in Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, reflecting this reluctance, or ‘reasonable
sensitivity’83), even in the attempt of avoiding the dispersed review of national provisions
from leading to conflicting case laws to the detriment of legal certainty.
In sum, the ECJ has brought to new life the legal source of the general principles and
foretold its disruptive effect (i.e., not merely hermeneutic anymore). It also clarified that the
entire Charter, all the more so, is a standard of review of national measures implementing
EU law. By normalizing the horizontal application of these sources,84 the ECJ shifts on the
individual’s part of the burden connected to some EU obligations that were until now
firmly binding on the States, such as those relating to the protection of fundamental rights
that are not traceable to the four market freedoms.
Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate the implications of Ku¨cu¨kdeveci: if the general
principle of non-discrimination has a wider scope than the measures codifying it (the
Directive), it follows that it can be invoked in a series of disputes that, despite concerning
EU-regulated matters, fall outside the scope of the Directive.85
On the other hand, the rights listed in the Charter (and/or qualifying as general
principle of the EU system86) are not necessarily linked to the operation of the Common
Market, nor are they bestowed only on workers: every individual benefits from Charter
rights (with the exception of those rights that are expressly recognized only to EU citizens),
and rights elevated to the status of general principles are typically unconnected to the needs
of the free market, since they originate from the common constitutional traditions.
83 See Sciarabba, supra, 16.
84 An outcome that is facilitated by the very wording of the Charter’s provisions. See, for instance, the prohibition
of discriminations at issue in Ku¨cu¨kdeveci (Art. 21). Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it was duly noted that
‘[o]n peut soutenir, par conse´quent, que l’article 21 produit e´galement un effet ‘‘horizontal’’ en s’appliquant directement aux relations
entre particuliers. En toute hypothe`se, l’article 21 peut impliquer des obligations positives a` la charge des autorite´s publiques visant au
respect du principe de non-discrimination jusque dans les relations des individus entre eux’ (cf. Commentary of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, drafted by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental
Rights, June 2006, Commentary to Art. 21 of the Charter, 188–195, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/
rights/charter/docs/network_commentary_final%20_180706.pdf>).
85 See Wiesbrock, supra, 548.
86 As for the procedure to identify such principles, especially those of civil law, see Case C-101/08, Audiolux
SA e.a. v. Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL), nyp, para. 63, and Case C-174/08, NCC Construction Danmark A/S v.
Skatteministeriet, nyp, para. 42 (general principles must emerge from common constitutional traditions, not from ordinary
legislation).
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With its case law on European citizenship and the rights connected thereto, the ECJ
had already opened a phase of transition, first expanding the subjective and objective reach
of the market freedoms and then extending them onto non-economic actors. The status of
European citizen, rather than bestowing new rights, has served as the legal untouchable
basis for the protection of fundamental freedoms within the EU. This thickening of the
rights of the citizens uti cives (as citizens) rather than uti mercatores (as business subjects) had
so far concerned the matters of welfare assistance and the trans-state provision of public
services.87 In other words, the ECJ had already gradually accepted that a State might be
called to bear at least some social burden to the benefit of citizens coming from another
Member State: this is already a minimal but effective formulation of solidarity.88
In Ku¨cu¨kdeveci, instead, private parties are called to give their contribution. Unques-
tionably, they are not requested to make financial disbursements or the like, yet the
prohibition for the employer to perform discriminatory actions can result in new and
consequential obligations for him:89 the rights of the individual are not anymore only a
concern of the Union and of national public administrations but also of the citizens of
the EU.90
87 See, for instance, L. Hancher & W. Sauter, ‘One Step beyond? From Sodemare to Docmorris: The EU’s
Freedom of Establishment Case Law Concerning Healthcare’, Common Market Law Review 47, no. 1 (2010): 117–146, and
the bibliography referred to therein; S. Jorgensen, ‘The Right to Cross-Border Education in the European Union’,
Common Market Law Review 46, no. 5 (2009): 1567–1590.
88 See, for example, M. Wind, ‘Post-national Citizenship in Europe. The EU as ‘‘Welfare-Rights Generator’’?’,
Columbia Journal of European Law 15, no. 2 (2009): 239–264, in particular 258 and the analysis of Case C-184/99, Grzelcyk
[2001] ECR I-6193, para. 44, referring to ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a . . .Member State
and nationals of other Member States’. See also the analysis of the implications of this case law in D. Kochenov, ‘Ius
Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status and Rights’, Columbia
Journal of European Law 15, no. 2 (2009): 169–238.
89 Symmetrically, the ‘damaged’ individual can have his rights and claims multiply, once reliance on the general
principles spares him from the boundaries of the directives’ direct effect; see Wiesbrock, supra, 548
90 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, para. B: ‘it must be noted that the nationals of the states
brought together in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the
intermediary of the European Parliament and the economic and social Committee’. This reference to the cooperation on
the part of the citizens, mediated by the bodies of the Community, was then little more than symbolic but is now
extended to a more direct model of cooperation. The Ku¨cu¨kdeveci judgment, in other words, might undermine the
egoistic model that has developed within the European Community, whereby ‘[t]he individual has rights; society, public
authorities have duties and responsibility’. See Weiler, supra.
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